13 March 2026 –
For many years, systemic corruption in Venezuela has been under the spotlight, an epidemic that has been heavily documented by investigative journalists, civil society organizations and experts worldwide. Following the United States takeover of Venezuela and capture of Nicolas Maduro late last year, the world has witnessed rapid political developments affecting the country and its assets held abroad. The Swiss Federal Council froze assets linked to the Maduro regime on January 5th, causing the international community to scrutinize how these “ill-gotten assets” will be handled, especially in a country suffering from long-standing systemic corruption.
In a webinar led by the Coalition’s Asset Recovery Working Group, held on January 29th, a distinguished panel of speakers came together to jointly chime in on the only possible and just outcome of handling these assets:
The fate of these stolen assets must not be obscured – they must be traced, seized and ultimately confiscated to one day be returned to the Venezuelan people.
This is an issue that must not be seen as a political one, but a rule of law issue. It bodes the question: if stolen assets are inevitably tied to political developments, can legal processes move forward independently of political changes?
In this webinar, speakers offered different viewpoints and expertise to help navigate a complex socio-political and economic issue in a country that is experiencing a multi-layered and deeply interconnected crisis.
The Venezuelan context and Swiss framework
Belén Aguinaga, from Due Process of Law Foundation (DLPF), provided background context to Venezuela’s kleptocratic regime, highlighting that systemic corruption thrives amid democratic and institutional breakdown, a situation further compounded by the human rights crisis. She states that these dimensions reinforce each other into a single, self-sustaining system of dysfunction.
Against this backdrop, Pedro Gomes Pereira, lawyer and asset recovery expert, looked at the current legal and procedural steps of the sanctions regime in Switzerland. On January 5, 2026, the Swiss Federal Council took a significant step by freezing assets linked to 37 individuals associated with the Maduro regime under the Federal Act on the Freezing and the Restitution of Illicit Assets (FIAA). While this is a bold political signal, he stressed that the legal reality is more nuanced.
In Switzerland, expropriation is prohibited by the constitution; property can only be confiscated through a judicial order. Seeing as the Federal Council cannot initiate investigations, nor do they actually know if the listed individuals in Venezuela have assets in the country, the decision to freeze assets was a political one. The goal of this “preventive” freeze is to provide the “affected state”–in this case, Venezuela—the time to reorganize its institutions and initiate the criminal investigations necessary to request Mutual Legal Assistance (MLA) and eventually get hold of the frozen assets. However, in practice, when dealing with a context like that of Venezuela’s, the theory tends to fall short: what happens when a country is not able to meet the required legal threshold to seize the assets back?
Indeed, the path to recovery in Venezuela remains steep. Pedro suggests that returning these funds could take between 15 to 30 years, drawing on previous similar cases. Confiscation typically requires a successful legal proceeding in either Switzerland or Venezuela to prove the underlying criminality. While Swiss authorities can initiate their own investigations, they remain heavily reliant on evidence that must come from the very jurisdiction where the assets were stolen. Taking into account the systemic corruption riddled across Venezuela, this could take a very long time.
Comparative perspectives and sanctions regimes
Dr. Clara Portela, Professor of Political Science at the University of Valencia, followed with a comparative perspective between the Swiss measures and past adopted European Union (EU) measures.
The EU employs standard foreign policy to freeze assets for one-to-two-year intervals, with no tailored response for contexts like Venezuela. They also usually remain extra reluctant to confiscate assets without a clear criminal proceeding initiated in the country of origin – similarly to the case of Switzerland. These processes have proved hugely problematic in the past, as seen with Egypt and Tunisia during the Arab Spring where the countries of origin were reluctant, or not able, to provide evidence that assets were illegitimate, causing the assets to be frozen almost indefinitely.
In contrast, Maria Alejandra, CEO at the Venezuelan Asset Recovery Initiative (INRAV), shines light on an alternative emerging approach in the United States. Although the US has better established legal pathways in place to return confiscated assets, the current frameworks are still inapplicable to the Venezuelan context. In response to the limitations, they have proposed to create a new special fund to manage the seized assets, called the Venezuela Restoration Fund.
She states that Venezuela is years away from having an independent judiciary or legitimate authority capable of receiving assets, and guaranteeing they won’t be recaptured by the same corrupt networks. This could create a serious risk of re-victimization which is the gap advocacy efforts have been focused on targeting at INRAV.
Through the Venezuelan Loot Tracker at INRAV, publicly available documents reveal that the seized assets amount to almost $4 billion. Thanks to efforts by lawmakers, civil society and policy experts, a new legal vehicle is being developed to manage the funds. The Venezuela Restoration Fund, proposed under the Preserving Accountability for National Assets Act (PANA Act), has seen rare bipartisan support in the U.S. House. Rather than letting assets sit in limbo, this fund would:
- Ring-fence assets to ensure they aren’t diverted for unrelated purposes.
- Protect funds from creditors, which is vital given the regime’s massive unpaid debts since 2016.
- Prioritize the Venezuelan population by supporting institutional rebuilding, independent media, and human rights efforts.
- Signal predictability, by signalling courts, prosecutors and international partners that confiscation does not lead to a dead end.
The fund operates “downstream” from the law, meaning it only receives assets after a U.S. court has issued a final confiscation order, ensuring that due process and the legal establishment of illicit origins are fully respected.
The time to act is now
Towards the end of the webinar, panelists agreed that to ensure “ill-gotten” assets from Venezuela were legitimately returned to its people, the legal process must start its proceedings as soon as possible to show commitment of returning the assets.
Confiscation must be legally linked to restitution now, rather than waiting for a total political transition in Venezuela. Waiting is a mistake because assets may disappear, and the window for accountability could close.
With nearly eight million Venezuelans displaced in a humanitarian crisis driven by systemic corruption, asset recovery is no longer just a technical legal issue but a human rights issue. Returning these funds is a form of reparative justice. By creating transparent, victim-centered legal vehicles today, the international community can ensure that the billions stolen from the Venezuelan people actually serve to rebuild their future.
Visit the Asset Recovery Working Group page for more information.