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Review of implementation of the United Nations
Convention against Corruption

Executive summary

Note by the Secretariat

Addendum

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II. Executive summary

United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

1. Introduction

1.1. Overview of the legal system of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

The United Kingdom (UK) is a constitutional monarchy. The Parliament at Westminster in England remains the seat of Government for the UK, but Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland also have a degree of devolved government. The UK has independent judiciaries.

Treaties do not, on ratification, automatically become incorporated into UK law. For this reason, the UK only ratifies international conventions once UK law is deemed by the Government to be compliant.

In the UK legal system, there are both overarching laws that cover the entire UK and laws that cover only England and Wales, Scotland, and/or Northern Ireland.

While many provisions of law are statutory in nature, some are contained in the “common law” of England, Wales, and Northern Ireland, which consists of the UK’s historical legal traditions that have been interpreted and made binding through judicial precedent. While closely related, the legal traditions of Scotland, which has a mixed common law/civil law history, differ in some regards.

1.2. Overview of the legal and institutional framework against corruption of the United Kingdom in the context of implementation of the United Nations Convention against Corruption

Currently, the Cabinet Office houses the international anti-corruption Champion. The Champion coordinates activities across government, working closely across Departments, devolved administrations, law enforcement, prosecution authorities and regulatory agencies to ensure a coherent and joined-up approach to combat international corruption.

The Attorney General for England and Wales is the Minister responsible for superintending the main prosecuting authorities, the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) and the Serious Fraud Office (SFO).

In Scotland, most serious corruption cases are handled by the Serious and Organised Crime Division contained within the Crown Office.

The Public Prosecution Service (PPS) is the principal prosecuting authority in Northern Ireland.

The SFO is responsible for investigating and prosecuting serious or complex fraud cases, and is the lead agency in England and Wales for investigating and prosecuting cases of overseas corruption. Besides that, there are a considerable number of other national, regional and local authorities (such as the Serious Organised Crime Agency (SOCA), the Metropolitan Police, the City of London Police and others) that have competence to deal with corruption related offences, depending on the specific context or place of their emergence.
2. Chapter III: Criminalization and law enforcement

The review indicates that the UK legal system, despite its complex and multifaceted character, criminalizes corruption related offences in accordance for the most part with the requirements of Chapter III. Equally, UK law enforcement mechanisms are highly adequate and in some ways exemplary for the purposes of the Convention.

2.1. Observations on the implementation of the articles under review

Bribery and trading in influence (Articles 15, 16, 18, 21)

Bribery in both the public and private sector, as well as bribery concerning foreign public officials and officials of public international organizations are all comprehensively criminalized in the Bribery Act 2010.

Although the UK bribery offences do not use the concept of a “public official”, they cover all cases involving persons performing a public function or providing a public service, including members of Parliament, employees of public enterprises, soldiers and public servants serving abroad. As to bribery in the private sector, the Bribery Act applies to any person who “directs or works, in any capacity, for a private sector entity” (as defined in the Convention), even if the person’s function or activity has no connection with, or is performed outside, the UK. Equally, the concept of a “foreign public official” in Section 6 subs. 5 of the Bribery Act reflects all elements of the definitions of Article 2 (b) and (c) of UNCAC.

Furthermore, despite the unusual and complicated structure of the offences of active and passive bribery, all required objective and subjective elements are contained in the relevant provisions. Regarding trading in influence, the general bribery offences in the Bribery Act 2010 are broad enough to cover most circumstances related with the behaviour in question.

Sanctions for bribery offences differ depending on whether there is a summary conviction or a conviction on indictment and reflect to some extent the different jurisdictional limits applied in different parts of the UK. In the vast majority of cases, corruption would be triable on indictment, whereby sanctions could reach an unlimited fine and/or imprisonment of up to 10 years.

Money-laundering, concealment (Articles 23, 24)

UK law criminalizes money-laundering and concealment in accordance with the Convention.

Sections 327 and 334 of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 cover the concealment, disguise, conversion, transfer and removal of criminal property, which constitutes a person’s benefit from criminal conduct. Conspiracy and attempts to commit offences, aiding and abetting and counselling the commission of crime are criminalized in Sections 328 and 340 subs. 11(b) and (c).

The UK takes an “all crimes” approach to money-laundering that encompasses conduct which constitutes an offence in any part of the UK or which would constitute an offence in the UK, had the conduct occurred there. The UK has not excluded self-laundering and has even dispensed in some cases with dual criminality as a prerequisite to recognize foreign predicate offences.
Concealment is also fully covered and includes the rights acquired by someone in relation to the property under judgement. UK law goes even further than the Convention, covering also the mere suspicion that such property constitutes or represents a person’s benefit from criminal conduct.

Embezzlement, abuse of functions and illicit enrichment (Articles 17, 19, 20, 22)

UK law does not differentiate between embezzlement in the public and private sector. Embezzlement, misappropriation or other diversion of property is criminalized in the Theft Act 1968 and the (almost identical) provisions of the Theft Act (Northern Ireland) 1969, and potentially the Fraud Act 2006, which applies in England, Wales and Northern Ireland. The common law offence of misconduct in public office corresponds to the UNCAC offence of abuse of functions.

In Scotland, embezzlement is covered by a common law offence. As to the abuse of functions, there is a common law offence of breach or neglect of duty by a public official, which is broadly similar to the English offence of misconduct by a public official.

Regarding the offence of illicit enrichment, its establishment was considered during the development of the legislative proposals that became the Bribery Act 2010, and rejected as contrary to the fundamental principles of the UK legal system and incompatible with the presumption of innocence and Article 6(2) of the European Convention on Human Rights. In view of this and the non-mandatory nature of the article, the UK statement is deemed satisfactory.

Obstruction of justice (Article 25)

The UK appears to criminalize obstruction of justice in accordance for the most part with the Convention.

In England and Wales, the use of physical force, threats or intimidation to interfere with witnesses or potential witnesses (as well as persons assisting the investigation and jurors) is punished under Section 51 of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994. The conduct in question is also punishable under the common law offence of perverting the course of justice. Further, the use of corrupt means to interfere with witnesses could be punished as incitement under a number of statutes. The implementing laws in Scotland and Northern Ireland are summarized in the report.

Liability of legal persons (Article 26)

In the UK the liability of legal persons is regulated in accordance with Article 26 of the Convention.

The underlying legal principles in relation to corporate criminal liability can be found in the Interpretation Act 1978, which notes that subject to the appearance of a contrary intention, the word “person” in a statute is to be construed as including “a body of persons corporate or unincorporated”, and the common law “identification doctrine”. The liability of legal persons is without prejudice to the criminal liability of natural persons.
In addition to the above, Section 7 of the Bribery Act introduces the strict liability of a “relevant commercial organization” that fails to prevent associated persons from engaging in bribery. This has been identified as a good practice (see below).

**Participation and attempt (Article 27)**

The common law of the UK recognizes the commission of offences by principals and secondary parties, the first being persons who most directly perpetrate the offence, and the latter ones who aid, abet, counsel or procure the commission of the offence. Relevant provisions of law cover all possible forms and variations of instigation, preparation and attempt, either as forms of participation in the offence committed by the principal, or as stand-alone offences. The legal provisions (including for Scotland) are summarized in the report.

**Prosecution, adjudication and sanctions; cooperation with law enforcement authorities (Articles 30, 37)**

The UK appears to regulate prosecution, adjudication and sanctions in accordance for the most part with UNCAC Article 30. The establishment of criminal sanctions is without prejudice to the exercise of disciplinary powers by the competent authorities against civil servants and there are no immunities or jurisdictional privileges accorded to UK public officials, including Members of Parliament as regards investigation, prosecution or adjudication of UNCAC offences.

With regard to Article 37, Sections 71-75 of the Serious Organised Crime and Police Act 2005 (SOCPA), as amended by Section 113 of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009, appear to regulate the treatment of persons who cooperate with law enforcement authorities in accordance with the Convention. In Scotland there exists nearly identical legislation concerning privileges of persons who cooperate with the authorities in accordance with its fundamental principles.

The protection and safety of persons who cooperate is the same in the UK as for witnesses under Article 32. Additionally, in England and Wales, Section 82 SOCPA makes special provision for the protection of witnesses and certain other persons involved in investigations or legal proceedings. Other implementing laws (including for Scotland and Northern Ireland) are referenced in the report.

**Protection of witnesses and reporting persons (Articles 32, 33)**

UK chief officers of police and heads of law enforcement agencies have access to an extensive range of measures to protect witnesses, based on the provisions of SOCPA, including full witness protection programmes involving witness relocation, a change of identity and a high degree of confidentiality. These measures fully cover the requirements of Article 32.

The same can be said about the protection of reporting persons. The Public Interest Disclosure Act 1998 amending the Employment Rights Act 1996 added whistle-blowers to others given special protection against dismissal or other detrimental treatment, and Northern Ireland has enacted similar legislation.

**Freezing, seizing and confiscation; bank secrecy (Articles 31, 40)**

The UK has a value-based confiscation system. In the UK legal system, confiscation, as well as the detection, freezing, seizing, and administration of
property, are mainly covered, in a comprehensive manner, by the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 and the Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000. The basic regulations in England and Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland are identical.

The UK is also in compliance with UNCAC Article 40. The provision of information by financial institutions is generally governed by old case law (Tournier v National Provincial and Union Bank of England (1924) 1KB461), which still holds as good practice addressing how and why confidentiality may be breached.

Statute of limitations; criminal record (Articles 29, 41)

There is no statute of limitations in UK criminal law. As to criminal records, in England and Wales and Northern Ireland the courts may admit evidence of previous foreign convictions, provided that the offence would also have been an offence in England and Wales and Northern Ireland, respectively, if it had been committed there. In Scotland, previous convictions are generally not admissible as evidence in criminal proceedings, with very limited exceptions. However, given the optional character of Article 41, the UK is in compliance with its requirements.

Jurisdiction (Article 42)

It is a general principle of UK criminal law that there is jurisdiction over offences committed in the territory of the UK. Territorial jurisdiction may also be established by statute, as is the case in a number UNCAC offences. As regards subparagraph 1 (b) of Article 42 (flag principle), jurisdiction in relation to offences committed on board UK ships has been established only under the law of England and Wales and Northern Ireland.

The UK does not recognize the passive personality principle nor the state protection principle. With respect to bribery, however, an extended active nationality principle covers all persons who have “a close connection with the United Kingdom”, including not only British citizens, but also individuals ordinarily resident in the UK, bodies incorporated under UK law (including UK subsidiaries of foreign companies) and Scottish partnerships.

In view of the above, the UK is deemed to be in compliance, for the most part, with Article 42.

Consequences of acts of corruption; compensation for damage (Articles 34, 35)

According to UK regulations, a person (whether individual or corporate) can be excluded from bidding for public sector contracts and/or have their existing public sector contracts terminated in the event of a conviction for specified bribery or corruption offences. In other cases contracting authorities have discretion to exclude a person from bidding for a public sector contract.

Furthermore, for individuals who have suffered financial damage as a result of acts of corruption, UK law enables them to pursue compensation from actors involved in such actions when these actors intended or were aware that damage was going to be inflicted, even if a public authority is complicit in a corrupt process.
Specialized authorities and inter-agency coordination (Articles 36, 38, 39)

The UK has in place independent and largely effective mechanisms to combat corruption in accordance with Article 36. It also features mechanisms to encourage cooperation between national law enforcement authorities and the private sector, as well as provisions to encourage the public in general to report offences.

2.2. Successes and good practices

With respect to the liability of legal persons, Section 7 of the Bribery Act introduces the strict liability of a “relevant commercial organization” that fails to prevent associated persons from bribing on its behalf in order to obtain or retain business or an advantage in the conduct of business. In creating an obligation for relevant commercial organizations to prevent bribery, Section 7 is considered to be an effective deterrent measure and has led many commercial entities to adopt comprehensive preventive procedures. Given this consequence, as well as the general positive response of the prosecuting authorities and the business sector to this measure, the evaluators consider the measure a good practice that could be applied not only in countries with a criminal liability regime but also in other countries.

Additionally, the UK regulates the protection of witnesses, experts and victims in a manner which could be considered a good practice for the advancement of the goals of the Convention. All provisions of the relevant article, mandatory and non-mandatory, appear to be fully implemented. Accordingly, the competent authorities are in a position to provide effective protective measures ranging from personal/home security measures and non-disclosure of information to permanent relocation and full identity change. Witnesses (including the victims of the crime) and experts may give testimony by means of communications technology. Finally, protection arrangements are taken in full consultation with the victims, they are exposed in a written form and the victims are updated and assisted by Witness Service.

The UK’s whistle-blower protection system also represents a good practice, though more could perhaps be done to raise awareness about the possible protections and mechanisms for reporting.

2.3. Challenges in implementation

A general observation regarding the implementation of Chapter III by the UK concerns the issue of statistical data relating to the investigation and prosecution of corruption offences, including sentences or fines imposed. Although some data is collected by individual authorities, there is no consistency in the type of data that is collected and no central mechanism exists through which such data can be accessed. While the creation of a National Criminal Agency could address the issue of the collection and availability of data, measures could also be taken under the current framework to promote the consolidation and accessibility of such data.

In view of the fact that the Bribery Act 2010 came into force very recently, it is too early to ascertain the implementation of its provisions in practice. While noting the UK’s high level of compliance with UNCAC regarding bribery offences, the reviewers identified some scope for follow-up or improvement:
UK law does not provide for an aggravated form of bribery nor does it make any distinction, with regard to sentencing, between bribery in the public and in the private sector, bribery of national and foreign officials, or bribery involving a breach or duty, facilitation payments and other forms of gift-giving. This does not run contrary to the standards of the Convention; however, the experts recommend that the UK revisit the issue of sentencing pertaining to acts of bribery in the public and private sectors in light of actual sentences and sanctions under the new law.

With regard to embezzlement, abuse of functions and illicit enrichment, the reviewers identified the following scope for improvement:

- As suggested with regard to bribery offences and bearing in mind Article 22 and Article 30 par. 1 of the Convention, the UK could consider differentiating sanctions between public and non-public authorities.

- In order to detect and prove cases of corrupt payments and enhance the ability to monitor private wealth more effectively, consideration might be given to expanding the current system of interest declarations by public officials and parliamentarians to a system of asset declarations.

Regarding prosecution, adjudication, sanctions and cooperation with law enforcement authorities, while noting again the UK’s high level of compliance, there is room for the following remarks:

- With regard to UNCAC Article 30, and without prejudice to par. 9 of Article 30, the UK authorities could consider differentiating sanctions between persons carrying out public and non-public function, though the UK position is not incompatible with the standards of the Convention.

- Noting the Overarching Principles issued by the UK Sentencing Council (though these do not extend to Scotland) and recognizing the uncertainty surrounding the possible applicable penalties, the UK could consider issuing relevant sentencing guidelines under the Bribery Act. The UK might also consider looking more closely into the matter of out-of-court settlements involving the SFO, in order to ensure adequate transparency and predictability.

- The SFO’s operations have in recent years been partly funded by monies recovered in criminal confiscation cases and civil settlements. In this regard, it is suggested that all settlements be subject to judicial scrutiny independent from the prosecutor’s office and that an independent body could be considered, which would have a formal role in reviewing sensitive cases. Moreover, companies that reach settlements could be asked to commit to compliance programmes and the appointment of an independent expert monitor where remedial action is warranted. The SFO should also consider providing more detail on civil settlements on its website, for example concerning guidance on what factors are taken into account in determining the recoverable amount in civil settlements.

With respect to jurisdiction, the following shortcoming has been identified:

- The flag principle seems to apply only in relation to Convention offences established under the laws of England and Wales and Northern Ireland. In Scotland, even though Section 12 of the Bribery Act may cover some offences
committed on flagged ships within territorial waters of other countries, it is suggested that legislative provisions equivalent to section 3A of the Magistrates Courts Act 1980 or section 46A of the Senior Courts Act 1981 are introduced.

Finally, regarding specialized authorities and inter-agency coordination, the reviewers observe the following:

• Much of the focus of the specialized units is on foreign fraud and bribery rather than domestic corruption. Although this is commendable and in many ways unique among other countries, the UK might consider focusing additional resources on domestic measures, in particular the extension of the International Anti-Corruption Champion to the domestic sphere and tasking him to consider developing a national anti-corruption strategy.

• Further, the reviewers were of the opinion that the creation of a National Crime Agency (NCA) should not detract from the current momentum of enforcement of bribery and corruption cases in the wake of the Bribery Act, nor lead to further cuts in resources and staffing of the relevant enforcement agencies, in particular the SFO. Funding for the SFO is determined on a rolling three-year basis, and the SFO has seen a 30 per cent budget cut in the last four years.

3. Chapter IV: International cooperation

The review indicates that the UK is compliant with the standards and obligations imposed in Chapter IV and possesses a wide and robust array of legislative, treaty, and practical tools to meet the international cooperation requirements of the Convention, as well as broad experience in the use of these tools.

3.1. Observations on the implementation of the articles under review

Extradition (Article 44)

The UK has a complex but comprehensive legislative framework for enabling the extradition of fugitives. The complexity of the framework derives in part from the fact that the procedures and requirements for extradition may vary depending on the legislative category that the requesting State falls into, as well as which region of the UK (England and Wales, Northern Ireland or Scotland) is involved.

As the review makes clear, however, the UK is able to extradite to all States, even those which are included in neither Category 1 (EU Member States) nor Category 2 (designated non-EU Member States) of the Extradition Act 2003. Under Section 193 of the Extradition Act 2003, the UK may extradite to States which are its partners to an international convention where a specific designation under that section has been made. No designations have been made under Section 193 regarding UNCAC. Nevertheless, where an extradition request is received by the UK and the person sought is wanted for conduct covered by a convention that the UK has ratified, and the State seeking extradition is not a designated extradition partner, the UK will consider whether to enter into a “special extradition arrangement” under Section 194. In this manner, the UK may comply with the extradition requirements of UNCAC.
While, under Section 193 of the Extradition Act, the Convention could seemingly be a legal basis for extradition, the UK did not indicate whether the necessary designation under Section 193 has been made with respect to UNCAC and observed that UNCAC has never served as the basis for an extradition from the UK.

It is nevertheless clear that the UK’s extradition framework satisfies the requirements of the Convention regarding offences subject to extradition and the procedures and requirements governing extradition. The fact that the UK has criminalized as “equivalent conduct offences” UNCAC offences would seem to reduce any concerns on requirements for double criminality, one of the primary issues of concern in Chapter IV. Similarly, the UK’s willingness and ability to extradite its own nationals was favourably noted.

While the UK would appear to require the provision of prima facie evidence to enable extradition to UNCAC partners who would not qualify as Category 1 or Category 2 territories under UK legislation, the review indicates that these evidentiary requirements are applied in a flexible and reasonable manner.

Similarly, the review indicates that the differences between extradition procedures in Scotland and other parts of the UK are of more technical than substantive significance and do not affect the review’s conclusion that the UK complies with the requirements of the Convention.

Transfer of sentenced persons; transfer of criminal proceedings (Articles 45, 47)

The Repatriation of Prisoners Act 1984 governs the transfer of prisoners into and out of the UK. The Act enables the Secretary of State to order such transfer where there is a relevant international arrangement in place. The UK has prisoner transfer arrangements with over 100 countries and territories, including via the Council of Europe Convention on the Transfer of Sentenced Persons and the Commonwealth Scheme for the Transfer of Convicted Offenders.

The review would thus indicate the UK to be in compliance with the discretionary provisions on prisoner transfer in Article 45.

Although the UK authorities indicated that it is possible for the UK to transfer proceedings to other jurisdictions and to accept such transfers, it also appears that the UK does not have any specific legislative or treaty mechanisms to effectuate such transfers. “Transfer of proceedings” under the current UK practice involves simply accepting a foreign file for examination by UK prosecution authorities. If an independent basis for jurisdiction exists within the UK, the prosecution authorities may exercise discretion to undertake prosecution. In such cases, evidence is obtained via traditional mutual legal assistance (MLA) procedures. Because domestic procedures and guidelines do provide a practical basis under which the UK can and does entertain requests that cases pending in foreign jurisdictions be prosecuted in the UK, the review concludes that the UK complies with Article 47 of the Convention.

Mutual legal assistance (Article 46)

The UK possesses a wide capacity to provide the forms of MLA contemplated by the Convention. The UK’s legislative framework for MLA is very broad and undefined. Many of the UK’s capacities in this area have developed through policy
and practice rather than strict legislative requirements or procedures. Nevertheless, the review indicates that the UK, on a regular and effective basis, can and does provide the various forms of assistance contemplated under the Convention.

The UK can provide most forms of MLA without the need for an international agreement. The UK is also party to 35 bilateral mutual legal assistance treaties, has ratified another seven international conventions, and is party to additional EU and Commonwealth treaties.

The UK has two designated central authorities for MLA relevant to the Convention: The UK Central Authority, which has jurisdiction for England and Wales and Northern Ireland, and the Crown Office, which has jurisdiction for Scotland.

The most important legislation is the Crime (International Co-operation) Act 2003 (CICA), which regulates both MLA to foreign authorities and the UK’s authority to request assistance from foreign jurisdictions.

The provisions of CICA allow for a wide range of assistance, dependent on relevant criteria being met. Additional types of assistance are available through practice and policy, as outlined in the UK’s Mutual Legal Assistance Guidelines. The UK also possesses the ability to trace and freeze the proceeds of crimes covered by the Convention on behalf of foreign jurisdictions. In compliance with UNCAC, the UK does not decline to provide assistance on grounds of bank secrecy.

The review made clear that the UK’s abilities to provide MLA with respect to offences covered by the Convention is substantially enhanced by the utilization of specialized anti-corruption and fraud units, such as SOCA and the City of London Police and, most particularly, the SFO. Operations of the SFO in providing legal assistance in such cases greatly contribute to effective investigation of fraud and corruption cases.

**Law enforcement cooperation; joint investigations; special investigative techniques**

*Articles 48, 49, 50*

UK law enforcement authorities engage in broad, consistent and effective cooperation with international counterparts to combat transnational crime, including UNCAC offences. This cooperation relates, inter alia, to exchanges of information, liaising, law enforcement coordination, and the tracing of offenders and of criminal proceeds. A particularly prominent role in such activities is played by SOCA, and many examples of SOCA’s activities were provided during the review. Important roles are also played by the SFO, the City of London Police, the specialized units of the Metropolitan Police and by other law enforcement authorities. The level and effectiveness of these activities indicates effective compliance with UNCAC Article 48.

Investigating authorities in the UK make use of the mechanism of joint investigation teams (JITs), in particular with civil law jurisdictions in Europe, when their use will mitigate problems in receiving intelligence and investigative cooperation from those jurisdictions.

The UK has, and utilizes, the ability to cooperate with foreign law enforcement authorities, often through regular MLA procedures, in the utilization of special investigation techniques, including covert surveillance and controlled deliveries.
3.2. **Successes and good practices**

The review indicates that the UK handles a high volume of MLA and international cooperation requests with an impressive level of execution. The efficient operations of the UK in this sphere are carried out both by regular law enforcement authorities, such as the Home Office and the Metropolitan Police, but also through the effective use of specialized agencies, such as the SFO and SOCA, to deal with requests involving particularly complex and serious offences, including offences covered by the Convention. The effective use of this unique organizational structure merits recognition as a success and good practice under the Convention. In addition, the operations of aid-funded police units directed at illicit flows and bribery related to developing countries constitute a good practice in promoting the international cooperation goals of UNCAC. Similarly, the UK’s efforts at assisting law enforcement authorities in developing States in capacity-building to enable them to investigate and prosecute corruption offences also constitutes a good practice.

3.3. **Challenges in implementation**

The generally effective organization and performance of the UK in handling international MLA and cooperation requests has already been acknowledged. However, many of the practices and procedures of the UK in complying with Chapter IV of the Convention are undertaken in conformance with customary practice or informal guidelines, rather than pursuant to specific legislation or binding procedures and it is unclear if the Convention itself operates as an independent legal basis for the provision of cooperation under UK law. The reviewers are not incognizant that a culture of efficiency and performance may be even more significant than specific legislative enactments in ensuring substantive compliance with the Convention. Such a situation, however, mandates that consistent care and vigilance be exercised by the UK authorities regarding the actual workings and performance of its agencies in the area of international cooperation. This is particularly the case in light of proposed initiatives to establish a National Crime Agency. Care should be taken that any such reorganization not weaken successful agencies such as the SFO or impede present efficiencies in international cooperation.

The reviewers would also recommend a greater effort to maintain statistics regarding compliance with the Convention.